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COMMENT 
 
WORK, PLAY, TWEET: PUBLIC UNIVERSITY 
REGULATION OF EMPLOYED  
STUDENT-ATHLETE SOCIAL MEDIA USE* 
DARIUS LOVE**  
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the official formation of the National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(NCAA) in 1910, member-schools and student-athletes have experienced  
extraordinary success on and off the courts.1  The athletic prowess of  
student-athletes has enabled their respective colleges and universities to attain 
elusive national championships and unprecedented amounts of revenue derived 
from national sponsorship and media deals.2  However, as many student-athletes 
have come to discover, everything that glitters does not always lead to  
championship gold.  Recently, student-athletes around the nation have raised 
multiple concerns surrounding their legal rights.3  Most of the legal unrest found 
                                                          
*  This Comment was a co-winner of the National Sports Law Institute of Marquette University 
Law School’s 2015 National Sports Law Student Writing Competition. 
** J.D., Marquette University Law School, 2016; B.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 
2012. National Sports Law Institute Sports Law Certificate recipient and 2015-16 Comment Editor of 
the Marquette Sports Law Review. Darius would like to thank his family and fellow editors for  
providing support and feedback throughout this process. He would also like to extend his gratitude to 
Professors Paul Anderson and Paul Secunda, who inspired him to unite his interests in sports law and 
labor and employment law to produce this Comment. 
1. See, e.g., Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic Association's Role 
in Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 9, 12–21 (2000); NCAA Tournament: 
5 Best “Cinderella” Runs, CBS L.A. (Mar. 14, 2015), http://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2015/03/14/ncaa-
tournament-5-best-cinderella-runs/; Daniel D. Zillmer, The 50 Greatest College Football Programs 
All-Time Statistically Ranked, FANSIDED, http://fansided.com/2014/10/18/50-greatest-college-football-
programs-time-statistically-ranked/ (last visited June 9, 2016).  
2. See generally Eric Fisher, StubHub Becomes Sponsor of UNC Athletics, TRIANGLE BUS. J. (Nov. 
1, 2010), http://www.bizjournals.com/triangle/news/2010/11/01/stubhub-becomes-sponsor-of-unc-
athletics.html.  
3. See Patrick Vint, Ranking the NCAA's 5 Biggest Legal Battles, from Least to Most Threatening, 
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in today’s business of intercollegiate athletics centers around possible violations 
of antitrust law by the NCAA, as many student-athletes feel that they are being 
exploited for their talents and not receiving a rightful share of profits.4   
Additionally, former Northwestern football player Kain Colter and other  
Wildcat football players, under the guise of the College Athletes Players  
Association, raised one of the most significant and recently litigated issues  
affecting intercollegiate student-athletes.5  In addition to the apparent  
implications of labor and employment law, the question of student-athlete 
recognition as university employees also strikes at the foundation of free speech 
rights granted by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.   
The advent and widespread popularity of social media applications such as 
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Tumblr have drastically revolutionized the 
communication process in the twenty-first century.  The sweeping advantages 
of social media have been accompanied by a host of First Amendment  
implications and other potential free speech illegalities.  The free speech  
concerns associated with the regulation of student-athlete social media use  
permeate throughout almost every facet of today’s society, including the  
academic institution of intercollegiate athletics.  It has been strongly implied, 
through case law and public policy, that intercollegiate student-athletes enjoy a 
substantially diminished right to free speech, which extends to the relatively 
new communication platforms of social media.6  Although the bulk of case law 
precedent involving a student’s diminished right to free speech focuses on the 
claims of high school students, the courts’ reasoning in these cases indicates that 
similar standards apply to intercollegiate student-athletes because of their status 
as “student” athletes.7  Yet, despite the National Labor Relation Board’s 
(NLRB) unfavorable decision in the Northwestern unionization case applying 
                                                          
SBNATION (Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2014/3/20/5528032/ncaa-law-
suits-obannon-kessler-union.  
4. See Associated Press, NCAA Files Appeal of O'Bannon Ruling, ESPN (Aug. 21, 2014), 
http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/11387865/ncaa-files-intent-appeal-obannon-decision; 
see also Tom Farrey, Jeffrey Kessler Files Against NCAA, ESPN (Mar. 18, 2014), 
http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/10620388/anti-trust-claim-filed-jeffrey-kessler-chal-
lenges-ncaa-amateur-model; Associated Press, Shawne Alston Suing NCAA, Others, ESPN (Mar. 5, 
2014), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/10558893/ncaa-conferences-sued-scholarship-
value.  
5. Tom Farrey, Kain Colter Starts Union Movement, ESPN (Jan. 28, 2014), 
http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/10363430/outside-lines-northwestern-wildcats-football-players-
trying-join-labor-union.  
6. See generally Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2007). 
7. See id. at 587–601.  
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Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the First Amendment 
may afford employed student-athletes a higher degree of protection against  
university regulation of social media use.8  In the absence of relief for  
student-athletes seeking employee status under the NLRA, one can certainly 
foresee the enactment of state-adopted legislation recognizing student-athletes 
at public universities as employees.  
This Comment will analyze the application of First Amendment free speech 
rights to the regulation of intercollegiate student-athlete social media use by 
public universities, if student-athletes were granted employee status under state 
laws.  Part II provides an abbreviated historical analysis of the free speech rights 
granted to student-athletes under the First Amendment and examines how  
colleges currently apply these rights with respect to social media as a form of 
free speech.  Part III provides a comprehensive look into recent changes in  
intercollegiate athletics—with an emphasis on the Northwestern decision—that 
have the potential to limit university rules such as the regulation of social media 
use by student-athletes.  Part IV discusses the regulation of social media use of 
public-sector employees, and given the influence of the Northwestern  
unionization case on the conferral of employee status to student-athletes, how 
the institution of more favorable state labor laws would apply to student-athletes 
attending public universities.  Finally, Part V addresses whether the conferral of 
employee status will affect the degree of social media regulation that a public 
university can impart upon an employed student-athlete. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE REGULATION OF STUDENT-ATHLETE FREE 
SPEECH  
The legal issues surrounding the right to speak freely, as established by the 
First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, have permeated throughout every 
facet of society since the ratification in 1791.9  As many student-athletes have 
experienced, the world of intercollegiate athletics is not immune to the  
oftentimes bizarre disputes arising from this grey area of the law.  The beacon 
of light that has shakily guided student-athletes through the haze of free speech 
limitations originates from the exercise of the freedom of expression by high 
school students.10  In the twenty-first century, advances in social media have 
                                                          
8. See generally Office of Pub. Affairs, Board Unanimously Decides to Decline Jurisdiction in 
Northwestern Case, NLRB (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/board-
unanimously-decides-decline-jurisdiction-northwestern-case. 
9. About the First Amendment, FIRST AMEND. CTR., http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/about-
the-first-amendment (last visited June 9, 2016).  
10. See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
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further complicated the freedoms of speech and expression for student-athletes.   
A. Constitutional Origins of Student-Athlete Free Speech Regulation 
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states, “Congress shall make 
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”11  Also contained 
within the First Amendment’s free speech clause is the freedom of expression, 
which affords every individual the right to express opinions without  
governmental hindrance and to seek, receive, and communicate information and 
ideas through any media source, regardless of boundaries.12  The tenets of the 
First Amendment free speech and expression clauses extend to every member 
of the public, including student-athletes enrolled in public high schools,  
colleges, and universities.  In fact, the seminal case of Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District established the extent of power that a 
public institution holds over the regulation of free speech and expression  
exhibited by students.13  
In Tinker, two public high school students and one junior high student wore 
black armbands to school in opposition of the United States’ involvement in the 
Vietnam War.14  School officials warned the students that wearing the  
armbands, and refusing to remove them, would prompt suspension until the  
students returned without the armbands.15  The district court and the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled for the school board, reasoning that the 
school board’s actions were constitutional and reasonable to prevent disturbance 
of school discipline.16  On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and ruled 
for the students.17  The Supreme Court determined that the students’ act of  
wearing black armbands was more akin to pure speech protected by the First 
Amendment and did not present a “substantial disruption of or material  
interference with school activities.”18  For over forty-six years, the Supreme 
Court’s adoption of the “substantial disruption or material interference”  
standard established in Tinker has defined the free speech limitations placed not 
                                                          
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
12. See id.; see also Freedom of Expression, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/is-
sues/freedom-expression#.VQXSyhFFDmI (last visited June 9, 2016). 
13. See generally 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
14. Id. at 504.  
15. Id.  
16. Id. at 504–05. 
17. Id. at 514. 
18. Id. at 513–14.  
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only on public high school students, but intercollegiate student-athletes as 
well.19   
B. Current University Regulation of Student-Athlete Free Speech Rights with 
Respect to Social Media 
Moving into the modern-day realms of social media and intercollegiate  
athletics, the regulation of free speech rights has become complex and  
ambiguous.  Although the foundational rule of substantial disruption or material 
interference, as established in Tinker, still applies, the novelty of social media 
and the non-custodial relationship between university officials and  
intercollegiate student-athletes has muddied the application of the Tinker  
standard.   
Currently, the NCAA does not have a policy, bylaw, or recommendation 
mandating that member-schools monitor student-athletes’ social media use.20  
Instead, the NCAA has left this decision up to the discretion of its  
member-institutions.21  Although the demarcation of social media regulation 
can very likely blur into the violation of a student-athlete’s free speech rights, 
many private and public universities have elected not to ignore the issue due to 
the considerable risks associated with inappropriate social media use by  
student-athletes.22  For example, in the controversial investigation involving the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC) during the summer of 2011, 
the NCAA Enforcement Staff had reportedly been made aware of various  
violations by UNC’s football program through tweets found on two UNC  
football players’ Twitter accounts.23  The role that social media played in the 
heavy penalties imposed upon the UNC football program demonstrates the  
utility of student-athlete social media regulation by university officials.24  
In August 2010, UNC adopted an express policy addressing student-athlete 
social networking and media use.25  The policy calls for each sporting team to 
                                                          
19. See generally id.; see also Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 592 (6th Cir. 2007). 
20. Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Social Networks Pose Monitoring Challenge for NCAA Schools, 
NCAA.ORG (Feb. 14, 2013), http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/NCAANewsArchive/2013/february/so-
cial%2Bnetworks%2Bpose%2Bmonitoring%2Bchallenge%2Bfor%2Bncaa%2Bschoolsdf30.html.  
21. Id.  
22. Id.  
23. Jerry R. Parkinson, The Impact of Social Media on NCAA Infractions Cases, 1 MISS. SPORTS L. 
REV. 37, 46–47 (2012).  
24. See id.  
25. THE UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL, DEP'T ATHLETICS, POLICY ON STUDENT-ATHLETE 
SOCIAL NETWORKING AND MEDIA USE (Apr. 2012), http://studentathletes.web.unc. 
edu/files/2012/07/Social-Networking-Policy-updated.pdf.  
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“identify at least one coach or administrator who is responsible for having  
access to, regularly monitoring the content of, and/or receiving reports about 
team members’ social networking sites and postings,” also referred to as a 
“Team Monitor.”26  The policy permits UNC’s Department of Athletics to  
contract with an outside vendor to serve as the Team Monitor.27  As stated 
within the policy, UNC’s Department of Athletics does not mandate  
student-athletes to provide their social media passwords to the Team Monitor, 
and the Team Monitor may not independently access the student-athlete’s social 
media account.28  Furthermore, the policy subjects student-athletes to internal 
sanctions for a violation of the policy which “may include, but not be limited 
to, notice to remove the posting or photo, dismissal from the team, and/or  
reduction, cancellation, or non-renewal of athletics grant-in-aid.”29  
UNC’s social media policy is an example of a public university’s active 
stance with respect to the regulation of student-athlete social media use.  
Although the policy makes no mention of internal sanctions imposed upon a 
student-athlete for “substantially disrupting or materially interfering with” 
school activities, the language of the policy guidelines does leave some room 
for ambiguity concerning what constitutes “[d]erogatory or defamatory  
language” within the context of “disrespectful comments and behavior 
online.”30  Thus, UNC’s social media policy contains just enough wiggle room 
for university officials to combat a student-athlete’s potential allegation of free 
speech infringement.  
Another example of a public university’s regulatory methods with respect 
to student-athletes’ social media use is the University of California at Los  
Angeles’ (UCLA) Code of Conduct.31  Unlike UNC’s stand-alone social media 
policy, UCLA’s social media guidelines are contained within the UCLA  
student-athlete handbook.32  Similar to UNC’s policy, UCLA’s Code of  
Conduct warns student-athletes about the risks associated with social media and 
provides student-athletes with specific instructions on what not to post to social 
                                                          
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id.  
29. Id. 
30. Id.  
31. UCLA DEP’T INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, 2015–16 STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK & DAY 
PLANNER 16–17 (2015–16), http://www.uclabruins.com/fls/30500/pdf/SA-Handbook.pdf?DB_ 
OEM_ID=30500.  
32. See id.  
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media websites.33  One of the most ambiguous limitations found within the 
Code of Conduct that arguably falls within the grey area of free speech states 
that student-athletes cannot post “[d]erogatory or defamatory language about 
anyone, including coaches, officials, opponents, UCLA Athletics, UCLA, the 
Pac-12 or the NCAA.”34  Further, referring explicitly to the athletic  
department’s process of monitoring, the Code of Conduct states, “Coaches,  
Athletic Department administrators, the NCAA, faculty, staff, residential life, 
employers, alumni, the media and the UCLA Police Department can and do  
review these websites.”35  Finally, similar to the UNC policy, the UCLA Code 
of Conduct states that social media postings associated with a student-athlete’s 
profile can lead to “suspension or expulsion, with the reduction or cancellation 
of financial aid” if found to violate the Code of Conduct.36   
UNC’s social media policy and UCLA’s Code of Conduct both exemplify 
the high level of attention that social media has garnered in the intercollegiate 
athletics context.  The general methods of monitoring utilized by UNC and 
UCLA’s athletic departments appear to be in accordance with the expected 
course of supervision undertaken by most colleges and universities.  The  
potential free speech encroachments that lie within the UNC and UCLA social 
media guidelines stem from the vagueness associated with derogatory and  
defamatory language.  If classified as university employees, it is likely that  
student-athletes would be able to speak more freely on social media sites  
regarding issues of public concern, even if the student-athlete’s opinion is in 
opposition to their university–employer.  How would student-athletes achieve 
such a level of increased autonomy?  The first step would be the acquisition of 
federal and state employee status. 
III. RECENT CHANGES IN INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS WITH THE POTENTIAL 
TO LIMIT UNIVERSITY RULES CONCERNING THE REGULATION OF  
STUDENT-ATHLETE FREE SPEECH 
Recently, a number of legal claims brought by student-athletes and other 
interested parties involving possible violations of federal antitrust and labor 
laws have plagued the NCAA and its member-schools.  These legal claims strike 
at the very heart of amateurism, the core principle that the NCAA clings to in 
defense of its current governance and structure.37  From a linear perspective, if 
                                                          
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 16. 
35. Id. (emphasis omitted).  
36. Id. at 17.  
37. J. Freedley Hunsicker Jr., A Significant Attack on the NCAA's Principle of Amateurism, LEGAL 
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the NCAA is subject to antitrust and labor laws, public and private institutions 
that hold membership in the NCAA may also be individually subject to antitrust 
and labor laws.   
The NCAA’s litigation portfolio currently consists of a voluminous number 
of antitrust cases brought by student-athletes, as well as other interested  
parties.38  These cases include claims that the NCAA and EA Sports have  
improperly used the likenesses of student-athletes in video games without  
sharing the profits39 and allegations that the NCAA conferences and  
member-schools have unlawfully fixed prices to limit the amount of scholarship 
money a student-athlete can be awarded.40   
In addition to the aforementioned antitrust claims affecting the future of  
intercollegiate athletics, one of the most significant labor law claims recently 
examined involved the Northwestern Wildcats football program and the  
players’ rally to unionize as statutory employees under the NLRA.41  The  
decision of the Region 13 NLRB, in which the Regional Director found that 
Northwestern football players receiving grant-in-aid scholarships should be 
considered employees under Section 2(3) of the NLRA, had the potential to 
drastically alter several defining aspects of the relationship between  
student-athletes and the universities that they attend, including the regulation of 
student-athlete social media use.42  In the initial case, Northwestern failed to 
prove that grant-in-aid scholarship football players should have been excluded 
from consideration as employees under the NLRA.43  Instead, the Regional  
                                                          
INTELLIGENCER, June 30, 2014 (archived on LexisAdvance). 
38. See Vint, supra note 3. 
39. Steve Berkowitz, Judge Releases Ruling on O'Bannon Case: NCAA Loses, USA TODAY (Aug. 
8, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2014/08/08/ed-obannon-antitrust-lawsuit-vs-
ncaa/13801277/. The O’Bannon ruling in favor of the class-action plaintiffs is currently on appeal by 
the NCAA. See generally Jon Solomon, NCAA Relies Heavily on Supreme Court Case to Appeal  
Paying Players, CBS SPORTS (Nov. 15, 2014), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/jon-
solomon/24810277/ncaa-relies-heavily-on-supreme-court-case-to-appeal-paying-players.  
40. Zac Ellis, What Does the Kessler Antitrust Lawsuit vs. the NCAA Mean? Michael McCann  
Explains, SI (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.si.com/college-football/campus-union/2014/03/17/ncaa-anti-
trust-lawsuit-jeffrey-kessler. It should be noted that the NCAA’s “Big Five” Conferences (ACC, SEC, 
Big Ten, Big 12, and Pac-12) recently passed autonomous legislation that allows colleges and  
universities to cover the full cost of attendance for scholarship student-athletes. See Mitch Sherman, 
Full Cost of Attendance Passes 79–1, ESPN (Jan. 17, 2015), http://espn.go.com/college-
sports/story/_/id/12185230/power-5-conferences-pass-cost-attendance-measure-ncaa-autonomy-be-
gins.  
41. Nw. Univ., No. 13-RC-121359, 2014-15 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15,781 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014). 
42. Id. at 1 n.1.  
43. Id. at 13.  
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Director found that Northwestern’s scholarship football players were employees 
under the NLRA for six primary reasons: (1) scholarship football players  
perform services for the benefit of the employer (university) for which they  
receive compensation, not financial aid; (2) scholarship football players are  
subject to the university’s control in the performance of their duties as football 
players; (3) scholarship football players are not primarily students, but rather 
athletes; (4) the athletic responsibilities of scholarship football players do not 
constitute a central element of their educational degree requirements; (5) the 
athletic duties of scholarship football players are not supervised by academic 
faculty; and (6) scholarship football players are not temporary employees as 
defined by the NLRA.44   
Although the decision of the Regional Director was appealed and later  
dismissed in favor of the NCAA and Northwestern by the NLRB,45 the case 
brought national attention to an issue that the NCAA and its member-institutions 
will likely be forced to revisit: under what circumstances could student-athletes 
be deemed employees.  The underlying tenets of the Northwestern University 
unionization case support the assertion that if student-athletes were able to  
acquire recognition as university employees under applicable state laws,  
regulation of their social media use by university officials would likely  
implicate a heightened degree of free speech rights.46  However, as a federal 
statute, the NLRA applies only to employers within the private sector.47  As the 
language suggests, “Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act . . . to 
curtail certain private sector labor and management practices, which can harm 
the general welfare of workers, businesses and the U.S. economy.”48  Thus, for 
student-athletes at public universities to receive recognition as employees,  
despite the shortcomings of their private school counterparts, the interpretation 
of employees under state labor laws would need to include intercollegiate  
student-athletes.49 
                                                          
44. Id. at 14–21.  
45. Ben Strauss, N.L.R.B. Rejects Northwestern Football Players’ Union Bid, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/sports/ncaafootball/nlrb-says-northwestern-football-play-
ers-cannot-unionize.html?_r=0.  
46. See generally Steven L. Willborn, College Athletes as Employees: An Overflowing Quiver, 69 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 65 (2014) (analyzing whether college athletes should be considered employees). 
47. National Labor Relations Act, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/resources/national-labor-relations-
act (last visited June 9, 2016).  
48. Id.  
49. See Frequently Asked Questions: Is My Employer Subject to the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA)?, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/resources/faq/nlrb#t38n3208 (last visited June 9, 2016).  
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IV. REGULATING FREE SPEECH OF PUBLIC-SECTOR EMPLOYEES 
The degree of autonomy with respect to an employee’s exercise of his or 
her First Amendment free speech rights differs in scope and legal governance 
depending on the setting in which the employee works.  Employees are  
classified as either private-sector or public-sector employees.50  This distinction 
extends to the classification of employees who work for private or public  
universities.  Accordingly, if granted employee status, whether a student-athlete 
attends a private or public university plays a major role in the extent to which 
university officials would be permitted to regulate the employed  
student-athlete’s social media use.  
It is well-established that fundamental rights granted by the U.S.  
Constitution, such as free speech, are substantially lessened, if at all applicable, 
by the legitimate interests of private employers.51  As applied to the context of 
private universities and the hypothetical of employed student-athletes, this lack 
of constitutional deference permits private university officials and athletic  
administrators to broadly define what constitutes disruptive speech and enforce 
vague policies that disallow the expression of unpopular opinions that are not 
favored by the university.52  For example, Northwestern University’s Athletic 
Department (a division of a private university) employs an online social  
networking policy that “educat[es] and protect[s]” student-athletes from the 
dangers of posting information via social media that may constitute  
inappropriate behavior, including posts addressing controversial topics or  
opinions.53  In effect, the Northwestern Athletics’ social networking policy  
subjects student-athletes to sanctions for failure to agree and adhere to a policy 
                                                          
50. Jared Lewis, What Is the Meaning of Public Sector Employment vs. Private?, CHRON, 
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/meaning-public-sector-employment-vs-private-32297.html (last  
visited June 9, 2016).  
51. See Douglas E. Lee, NLRB Bolsters Private-Employee Speech, FIRST AMEND. CTR. (Sept. 14, 
2011), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/nlrb-bolsters-private-employee-speech; Martin Berman-
Gorvine, Employer Ability To Silence Employee Speech Narrowing in Private Sector,  
Attorneys Say, BLOOMBERG BNA (May 19, 2014), http://www.bna.com/employer-ability-silence-
n17179890580/.  
52. See Harvey A. Silverglate, David French & Greg Lukianoff, Free Speech Rights on Private  
College Campuses: Free Speech and the Private University, KNOW MY RTS., http://www.know-
myrights.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=44:free-speech-rights-on-private-col-
lege-campuses&catid=18&Itemid=123 (last visited June 9, 2016).  
53. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY ATHLETICS 2015–2016 10 (2015), http://sidearm.sites.s3.amazo-
naws.com/nusports.com/documents/2015/10/19/2015_2016_Student_Athlete_Hand-
book.pdf?id=13625; see also id. at 11 (depicting the social media decision process that student-athletes 
should adhere to as recommended by Northwestern Athletic Department).  
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that has the contractual power to restrain the student-athletes’ free speech 
rights.54   
Despite the broad powers afforded to private employers with respect to the 
regulation and limitation of employee free speech rights, the NLRA provides 
private employees with a legally grounded means of protection against the  
employers’ absolute regulation in this area.55  Under Section 7 of the NLRA, 
private employees have the right to use free speech when engaging in concerted 
activity for the mutual aid and protection of the collective unit.56  As such, if 
student-athletes at Northwestern were to have been granted employee status, 
they would have been able to utilize social media to discuss controversial topics 
or opinions for the mutual aid and protection of the collective student-athlete 
population under the security of the NLRA.57 
The recent NLRB decision, which dismissed the petition for recognition as 
statutory employees filed by football players receiving grant-in-aid scholarships 
at Northwestern University, implicates many privileges afforded to  
student-athletes, including free speech rights.58  However, as mentioned earlier, 
a decision in favor of the Wildcat football players would have applied only to 
private universities and colleges.59  In the interest of equality and competitive 
balance amongst student-athletes across the nation, it is highly plausible that 
student-athletes attending public universities or colleges will seek to achieve 
employee status as well.  With the exception of Michigan, and likely Ohio, the 
labor laws of many states do not expressly prohibit student-athletes from  
acquiring recognition as public employees.60  Accordingly, many  
student-athletes attending public universities around the nation could make a 
strong case for state-based employee status based on the definition and  
interpretation of the term “employee” as found within the states’ labor law  
statutes.61   
                                                          
54. See id. at 10.  
55. See Staughton Lynd, Employee Speech in the Private and Public Workplace: Two Doctrines or 
One?, 1 INDUS. REL. L.J. 711, 753–54 (1977). 
56. Id. at 753; see also National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2016).  
57. 29 U.S.C. § 157.  
58. See generally Office of Pub. Affairs, supra note 8.  
59. See National Labor Relations Act, supra note 47.  
60. See Christian Dennie, Michigan Governor Signs Law Excluding Student-Athletes from the  
Definition of Public Employee for the Purposes of Collective Bargaining, BARLOW GARSEK & SIMON, 
LLP (Jan. 7, 2015, 3:39 PM), http://www.bgsfirm.com/college-sports-law-blog/michigan-governor-
signs-law-excluding-student-athletes-from-the-definition-of-public-employee-for-the-purposes-of-
collective-bargaining; Sara Ganim, Some Ohio Lawmakers Don’t Want College Athletes Unionized, 
CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/08/us/ohio-athletes-union-ban/ (last updated Apr. 8, 2014).  
61. Jaime Miettinen, Could Michigan Be Starting a New Trend by Excluding Public University  
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For instance, Section 810.2 of the California Government Code defines  
employee as “an officer, judicial officer as defined in Section 327 of the  
Elections Code, employee, or servant, whether or not compensated, but does not 
include an independent contractor.”62  Section 811.4 of the Code further defines 
a public employee as “an employee of a public entity.”63  Additionally, Section 
811.2 of the Code defines a public entity as including “the state, the Regents of 
the University of California, the Trustees of the California State University and 
the California State University, a county, city, district, public authority, public 
agency, and any other political subdivision or public corporation in the State.”64  
Because California’s definition of a public employee does not explicitly exclude 
student-athletes at public universities from consideration, the student-athletes 
could very well assert their status as employees given sufficient supporting  
evidence.65 
Illinois statutory law provides another example of state law under which 
public university student-athletes could be considered public employees.   
Chapter 5 of the Illinois Compiled Statutes defines a public employee or  
employee as “any individual employed by a public employer.”66  The statute 
further defines a public employer or employer as meaning “the State of  
Illinois . . . authorities including departments, divisions, bureaus, boards,  
commissions, or other agencies of the foregoing entities.”67  Similar to  
California public-sector labor laws, student-athletes attending public  
universities in Illinois could be considered public employees, should the  
relevant statutory language be interpreted broadly.68  
In light of the shifting atmosphere surrounding the idea of unionization for 
intercollegiate student-athletes, at least one state legislature has entertained the 
possibility of expressly allowing student-athletes to be deemed public  
employees for collective bargaining purposes.69  House Bill 6783, which has 
                                                          
Student-Athletes from Being "Public Employees"?, SPORTS L. BLONDE (Mar. 2, 2015), 
http://www.sportslawblondes.com/blog/2015/3/2/could-michigan-be-starting-a-new-trend-by-exclud-
ing-public-university-student-athletes-from-being-public-employees. 
62. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 810.2 (2016).  
63. Id. § 811.4.  
64. Id. § 811.2.  
65. See Miettinen, supra note 61.  
66. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/3(n) (2016).  
67. Id. 315/3(o). 
68. See Miettinen, supra note 61. 
69. See Daniela Altimari, Lawmakers Discuss Study Bill Allowing Student-Athletes to Join a Union, 
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been introduced to the Connecticut legislature, and if passed, will authorize the 
state’s labor commissioner to lead a study regarding the unionization of  
intercollegiate student-athletes at public universities and colleges in  
Connecticut.70  If the outcome of the commissioner’s unionization study were 
to lead to the recognition of college student-athletes as public employees,  
Connecticut could potentially spark a wave of legislation in favor of  
student-athletes across the nation.  
If established, the conferral of employee status to student-athletes attending 
public universities would catapult the issue of necessary revisions to free speech 
rights granted to these employed student-athletes, with an emphasis on the  
ever-expanding realm of social media. Although the argument has been made 
that the NLRA and First Amendment provide an almost identical degree of free 
speech protection to private and public employees, the broader scope of free 
speech rights guaranteed under the First Amendment seems to provide public 
employees with a more generous bundle of rights to levy against the employer.71 
In contrast to private employers and free speech rights under the NLRA, 
rules and policies instituted by public-sector employers that regulate the free 
speech of public employees fall within the purview of the U.S. Constitution and 
applicable state laws.72  The hallmark case of Pickering v. Board of Education, 
decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1968, sets out the standard by which a 
public employer may regulate the free speech of its employees.73  In Pickering, 
the defendant, the Board of Education, terminated the plaintiff, a public school 
teacher, for sending a written letter to the local newspaper criticizing the Board 
and superintendent’s management of a tax proposal intended to raise revenue 
for the local schools.74  As a public employer, the Board’s actions against the 
teacher for his opinion expressed within the letter fell within the scope of the 
First Amendment’s free speech clause.75  On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court 
ruled in favor of the Board of Education, reasoning that the teacher’s dismissal 
was appropriate because his adverse opinion of the Board’s actions, as  
                                                          
HARTFORD COURANT (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.courant.com/politics/capitol-watch/hc-bill-in-con-
necticut-would-study-whether-to-allow-studentathletes-to-unionized-20150226-story.html.  
70. Id.  
71. See Lynd, supra note 55, at 711.  
72. Christopher Raines, Private Sector vs. Public Sector Employee Rights, CHRON, http://smallbusi-
ness.chron.com/private-sector-vs-public-sector-employee-rights-47957.html (last visited June 9, 
2016).  
73. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
74. Id. at 564.  
75. See id. at 573.  
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expressed within the letter, were injurious to the interests of the school system.76  
However, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision and held 
that “absent proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made by him, a 
teacher's exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may not 
furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment.”77  Thus, Pickering 
stands for the proposition that a public employee may exercise his free speech 
rights when opining on issues of public concern, as long as the speech does not 
injure the employer’s business or hinder the efficiency of its operations.78   
Because social media has transformed the means by which private and public 
sector employees communicate, the legal principle of Pickering must now be 
applied to employee speech taking the form of Twitter tweets, blog posts, and 
Facebook comments.79  
Pickering addresses one of the most common methods of regulation that an 
employee may be subjected to by his or her employer with respect to free 
speech: simply “monitoring” the employee’s expressions and opinions voiced 
through writing, tweets, online posts, and comments.  Other public and private 
employers have gone so far as to mandate that employees relinquish their 
usernames and passwords to social media networks, emails, and the like.80  This 
more intrusive approach to social media regulation has prompted many states to 
adopt legislation expressly forbidding employers from asking employees to turn 
over their social media usernames and passwords.81  Currently, twenty-two 
states have either introduced or considered legislation that would prevent an 
employer from acquiring the username or passwords of employees.82  A minute 
number of states have also enacted legislation that entirely prohibits academic 
institutions from requesting or mandating a student to divulge his or her social 
media usernames or passwords.83   
                                                          
76. Id. at 565.  
77. Id. at 574.  
78. See id.  
79. See id. 
80. Associated Press, Employers Ask for Facebook Password, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 21, 2012), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/empoyers-ask-for-facebook-password-2012-3.  
81. Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct. 29, 
2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/employer-ac-
cess-to-social-media-passwords-2013.aspx.  
82. Id.  
83. Employer Access to Social Media Passwords: 2012 Legislation, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-
technology/employer-access-to-social-media-passwords.aspx.  
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The following laws, enacted by the California’s legislature, illustrate  
examples of state legislation that completely prohibits an employer from  
intruding upon an employee or student’s free speech rights through the invasion 
of social media accounts.  Assembly Bill 1844 applies to employers as follows: 
 
Prohibit[s] an employer from requiring or requesting an  
employee or applicant for employment to disclose a username 
or password for the purpose of accessing personal social media, 
to access personal social media in the presence of the employer, 
or to divulge any personal social media. . . . [P]rohibits an  
employer from discharging, disciplining, threatening to  
discharge or discipline, or otherwise retaliating against an  
employee or applicant for not complying with a request or  
demand by the [violating] employer . . . .84 
 
Senate Bill 1349 includes language regarding social media policies for  
postsecondary institutions: 
 
[P]rohibit[s] public and private postsecondary educational  
institutions, and their employees and representatives, from  
requiring or requesting a student, prospective student, or  
student group to disclose . . . personal social  
media . . . information . . . . [P]rohibit[s such] institution[s] 
from threatening . . . or taking [certain] actions for refus[al of 
a] demand [for such information] . . . .85 
 
The Senate Bill also requires these institutions to ensure compliance with 
these provisions and to post their social media privacy policies on their web 
sites.86  
 The enactment of these state laws governing social media regulation  
indicates that even without the conferral of employee status to intercollegiate 
student-athletes, states are gradually beginning to take progressive measures to 
protect the free speech rights of both public employees and students.87  The 
Pickering “matter of public concern” test, which governs the limitations that an 
                                                          
84. Assemb. B. 1844, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012). 
85. S.B. 1349, 2012 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012). 
86. Id.  
87. See Employer Access to Social Media Passwords: 2012 Legislation, supra note 83.  
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employer may place on a public employee’s free speech rights, and  
state-specific legislation governing student and employee rights to withhold  
social media usernames and passwords both demonstrate the current legal  
atmosphere surrounding the First Amendment in the public sector. 
V. REGULATING FREE SPEECH, VIA SOCIAL MEDIA, OF EMPLOYED  
STUDENT-ATHLETES AT PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES 
In the quest for answers concerning how the conferral of employee status 
would alter public university regulation of employed student-athletes with  
respect to free speech rights, the following suppositions have been  
contemplated: (1) student-athletes at public universities may be more likely to 
seek employee status under state laws in the wake of the national attention  
advanced by the NLRB’s decision to dismiss the unionization efforts put forth 
by Northwestern football players receiving grant-in-aid scholarships, and (2) in 
the absence of express state-law language stating otherwise,88 student-athletes 
at public universities could organize and lobby to be recognized as public  
employees.  Despite the existence of the possibility of employee status for  
student-athletes attending public universities, the probability that these  
student-athletes will actually be deemed employees depends largely on two  
factors: (1) whether the state in which the public university or college is located 
has expressly prohibited, by law, student-athletes from consideration as public 
employees, and (2) whether the applicable labor laws of the state support an 
interpretation that enables student-athletes to be considered as public  
employees.89  Thus, it follows that not every scholarship athlete attending a  
public university will be eligible for employee status.  
If student-athletes at public universities do acquire employee status, the  
legal standard used to determine the degree of protection afforded to the  
student-athlete’s free speech would present a complex question.  Should courts 
apply the substantial disruption or material interference with school activities 
standard from Tinker, or the matters of public concern standard enumerated by 
the court in Pickering?90  Snyder v. Millersville University provides persuasive 
insight as to how the free speech rights of publicly employed student-athletes 
                                                          
88. See generally Dennie, supra note 60.  
89. See generally Marc Edelman, 21 Reasons Why Student-Athletes Are Employees and Should Be 
Allowed to Unionize, FORBES (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2014 
/01/30/21-reasons-why-student-athletes-are-employees-and-should-be-allowed-to-unionize/.  
90. Compare Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969), with Pick-
ering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968). 
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would be assessed.91  Although Snyder was decided by the U.S. District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the reasoning of the court with respect 
to the free speech standard that should govern student employees at public  
institutions is sound.92  
In Snyder, the plaintiff was a participant in the Student Teaching Program 
of Millersville University.93  As a requirement for the successful completion of 
the program, the plaintiff served as a student-teacher in English at a local high 
school.94  During her tenure as a student-teacher at the high school, the plaintiff 
posted a disrespectful and inappropriate MySpace message inviting her students 
to befriend her on the social network, and allegedly referred to her teaching 
program superiors as “problems.”95  A photo of the plaintiff wearing a pirate 
hat and holding an alcoholic beverage accompanied the post.96  The district 
court determined that the plaintiff’s MySpace post triggered the Pickering  
matter of public concern standard because the plaintiff made the post with  
respect to and during the practice of her role as a teacher and not as a student in 
the traditional sense.97  Thus, the court’s decision of the applicable standard in 
Snyder indicates that the free speech of student-athletes who are also public  
employees will be afforded protection under the First Amendment when the 
speech concerns public matters.98 
The plaintiff’s social media post in Snyder concerned a personal matter as 
opposed to a matter of public concern;99 however, there may very well be other 
circumstances where an employed student-athlete’s social media speech would 
trigger a Pickering standard.  For example, consider if the athletic department 
of a public university adopted a social media policy similar to the UCLA Code 
of Conduct under which student-athletes are not allowed to post “[d]erogatory 
or defamatory language about anyone, including coaches, officials, opponents, 
[University] Athletics, [the University], the [Conference] or the NCAA.”100  
Now consider if the university’s athletic department experiences an unfortunate 
scenario in which a coach is found to have committed acts of domestic violence 
against his spouse and children.  Should an employed student-athlete under the 
                                                          
91. Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008). 
92. See id. 
93. Id. at *1.  
94. Id. at *2–3. 
95. Id. at *5.  
96. Id. at *6.  
97. Id. at *14–15.  
98. Id. at *16.  
99. Id.  
100. See UCLA DEP’T INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, supra note 31, at 16.  
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coach’s tutelage decide to make a Facebook post expressing his fervent  
disappointment and aversion for the coach’s actions, the argument could be 
made that the athlete’s speech constitutes a matter of public concern.101   
Although the student-athlete’s social media post could reasonably be seen as 
substantially disruptive and to materially interfere with the activities of the  
athletic department under the Tinker standard,102 his speech would likely be 
protected under the First Amendment because of his standing as a public  
employee.  
The hypothetical explained above may seem like a stretch of the  
imagination to some, but with the shifting climate of intercollegiate athletics, 
the conferral of employee status to student-athletes at public universities grows 
more plausible.  If student-athletes were to be recognized as public employees, 
the oppressive Tinker standard would no longer mute their freedoms of speech 
and expression.  Employed student-athletes would have greater liberty to openly 
discuss matters of public concern that may present views in opposition of the 
university or athletic department.  As the wave of social media continues to 
expand, employed student-athletes would have a number of social media  
channels to voice their opinions when appropriate.  
VI. CONCLUSION  
Currently, no uniform guidance exists that mandates the regulation of  
college athletes’ social media use by university officials.  However, with the 
potential negative impact that speech voiced through social media outlets can 
have on a university’s image, some university athletic departments have  
unilaterally enacted social media policies to monitor the speech of  
student-athletes.103  Despite having the autonomy to enact customized social 
media policies aimed at policing student-athlete tweets, comments, and posts, 
public university officials must still adhere to the parameters of the First 
                                                          
101. See Sandra Horley, Opinion: Why Domestic Violence Is Never a Private Issue, CNN, 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/19/opinion/opinion-domestic-violence-not-private-issue/ (last updated 
June 19, 2013).  
102. The employed student-athlete’s post may substantially disrupt or materially interfere with the 
activities of the athletic department if other student-athletes or athletic officials decided to voice their 
opinions, decided not to play for the coach, or decided to transfer to another institution as a direct result 
of the student-athlete’s initial Facebook post.  
103. Rex Santus, Social Media Monitoring Widespread Among College Athletic Departments, Pub-
lic Records Survey Shows, STUDENT PRESS L. CTR. (Mar. 16, 2014), http://www.splc.org/arti-
cle/2014/03/social-media-monitoring-widespread-among-college-athletic-departments-public-rec-
ords-survey-shows.  
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Amendment free speech clause.  If college athletes were to attain employee  
status under applicable state laws, the extent of their First Amendment free 
speech rights would be reasonably expanded. 
In a public university setting, employed student-athletes would possess 
more freedom to express their views using social media, even if the  
student-athlete’s opinion is not supported by the university or its officials, as 
long as the athlete’s speech pertains to a matter of public concern.  Under the 
Pickering public concern standard, instead of being subjected to almost  
automatic regulation of their social media messages, the context of an employed 
student-athlete’s social media use would be balanced against the legitimate  
objectives of the public university.104  Although employed student-athletes 
would enjoy more formidable free speech rights with respect to social media 
use as a result of a the public employer-employee status, the university would 
still possess authority to regulate the student-athlete’s social media content.   
 
                                                          
104. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574. 
